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LEGISLATIVE OPPRESSION: RESTRICTING
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY TO MARRIED COUPLES IS
AN ATTEMPT TO LEGISLATE MORALITY
Linda S. Anderson·
ABSTRACT
Since the days of Baby M, surrogacy arrangements have become a
well-accepted form of assisted reproduction. As one of the first
alternatives available to those who could not create families naturally,
surrogacy arrangements have been scrutinized and discussed from a
variety of angles. Today, state laws determine whether surrogacy is
allowed, establish the standards for the agreements and qualifications
of those who use this form of family creation, and set limits on
payments involved in such arrangements. Many states that regulate
surrogacy through legislation have restricted the availability of
surrogacy arrangements to married couples, thereby eliminating any
non-traditional heterosexual couples, single individuals, and in most
states, all same-sex couples.
At first glance, this distinction does not seem to violate
constitutional principles because it does not single out a suspect class,
nor does it appear to treat similarly situated people differently.
However, by reviewing a statutory scheme in Florida, where married
couples have two statutory options for surrogacy arrangements and
anyone else is limited to only one more burdensome option, it
becomes clear that the only possible reason for the different treatment
is the marital status of the intended parent or parents. This article
suggests that the distinction is based on an effort to legislate a
particular moral stance about marriage and families, explores whether
legislation based on morality alone is appropriate, and concludes that,
when morality is the only reason for a distinction, such legislation is
not appropriate. Consequently, the requirement that intended parents
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be married in order to avail themselves of the benefits of gestational
surrogacy arrangements is an inappropriate attempt to legislate
morality,
and the requirement
should
be
eliminated.
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INTRODUCTION

Steve and Marci, a married couple, tried for several years to start a
family with no success. They engaged the services of a fertility
specialist yet were still unable to conceive a child. Mitch and Laura,
a committed couple who had decided to forgo the traditional legal
trappings of marriage, were in a similar situation, unable to conceive
despite numerous alternative treatments. Glenn and Jim, a committed
gay couple, also wanted to start a family, yet wanted to be sure that at
least one of them was genetically connected to the child they would
raise together. Though each couple had some options available to
them, they all did not have the same options. While all could adopt,
and the two heterosexual couples could use a variety of assisted
reproductive techniques to attempt to conceive a child of their own,
in many states only Steve and Marci, the heterosexual married
couple, had the option to engage the services of a surrogate carrier to
help them have a child. 1
In many states, only married heterosexual couples have the option
of becoming the intended parents of a child born in conjunction with
a surrogacy contract. 2 This article will focus on the effect of
legislators' concerns about the marital status and sexual orientation of
the intended parents, and how that concern affects legislation related
to one particular form of assisted reproduction-the use of a
gestational surrogate to carry a child. Beginning in Part II, this article
will briefly introduce the history and evolution of legislation related
to surrogate arrangements, concluding the description of legislation
in Part III with an explanation of the current legislative schemes that
address surrogacy. Using Florida as its basis, Part IV addresses the
way legislation in this area discriminates against non-married couples
and individuals. After evaluating the various justifications for the
discrimination in Part IV, Part V explores the only remaining
potential justification, morality. Part VI explores the judicial
response to morals-based legislation and posits that legislation based
solely on morality expresses animus toward particular groups who do
not conform to that sense of morality. Part VII concludes that the
I.

2.

See JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 40 (2006); Darra L.
Hofman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe: " A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy
Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 449, 454-60
(2009); John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 323, 336 (2004).
Hofman, supra note I, at 454-60.
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only way to avoid the unconstitutional use of morality-based
justification that discriminates against single individuals and
unmarried couples is to allow all potential parents to make use of all
options regarding surrogacy arrangements.
Though the prominent cases involving surrogacy arrangements,
especially in the media, have involved intended parents who are
married, the use of surrogacy agreements is one of the few options
available to those who are in same-sex relationships or to those who
do not have an opposite-sex partner. 3 Almost all states that allow
surrogacy agreements restrict them to married couples or make the
process significantly more burdensome for unmarried intended
parents. 4 At the time the legislation was first introduced, imposing an
additional burden on those who were not in a heterosexual marriage
may have originally been designed to hinder those outside of
heterosexual marriages from using assisted reproduction techniques
in an effort to provide the most suitable environment for the resulting
children. 5 However, in today's world, parents come in all sizes,
shapes, marital statuses, and sexual orientations. There is no
legitimate reason to continue to differentiate between intended
parents based on marital status or sexual orientation. 6 Continuing to
do so is simply an effort to retain a hold on a specific moral view of
the world that is no longer as popularly agreed upon as in the past. 7
Imposing this moral view on everybody demonstrates animosity
toward those who do not conform. 8 This norm is based on an
outdated idea of morality-; one that is driven by religious views, and
one that is no longer a valid reason for restricting behaviors or rights
to access certain services, such as gestational surrogacy. 9
II.

SOCIETY'S DEBATE ABOUT SURROGACY

A. Background

Despite the innate need to procreate, not everyone is able to do so. 10
Infertility and its treatment have been documented as early as the
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

See Robertson, supra note 1, at 359.
See June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public Recognition for Adult
Partnerships, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 341,380 (2006).
See Hofman, supra note 1, at 460.
Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for
Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDERL. &PoL'Y 353, 374 (2011).
/d. at 373-74.
See id.
See id. at 374.
DAAR, supra note 1, at 10.
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fifth century B.C., when Hippocrates wrote of various recipes for its
cure. 11 Reasons for infertility vary. Possible causes of infertility
range from medical abnormalities in connection with reproductive
organs; side effects of treatments of other medical conditions, such as
chemotherapy or radiation treatment for cancer; social conditions;
and unknown causes. 12 Today, there are a variety of assisted
reproductive techniques to help infertile individuals have children.
These include techniques that allow for the introduction of sperm
through non-coital means, others that combine egg and sperm outside
the body and then introduce the fertilized egg back into the uterus or
fallopian tubes, and variations of these procedures that enhance the
chances of conception, such as intracytoplasmic sperm injection,
where the sperm is injected directly into the egg outside the body. 13
In addition, for those who are unable to carry a child regardless of
how it is conceived, surrogacy provides an option that allows at least
one of the gamete donors to be genetically connected to the resulting
child. 14 It is also possible to use a surrogate carrier with donated
gametes, allowing the intended parents to cause the child to be
conceived without contributing to the genetic materials used to do
so. Is
Until the 1980s, when the infamous Baby M case 16 brought
surrogacy to the nation's attention, most people had not considered
the complicated consequences of using a non-traditional approach to
family building. 17 Then came the media frenzy surrounding the Baby
M case. 18 Discussions about Marybeth Whitehead, the surrogate
mother who had used her own egg and the sperm of William Steam, a
married man whose wife was unable to bear children, became
II.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

/d. at 25.
See AM. SOC'Y REPROD. MED., INFERTILITY: AN OVERVIEW: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS, 6,
8-9, 11, 14 (20 12), available at http://asnn.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/
Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/infertility_overview.pd
f; U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-358, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL
AND
SOCIAL
CHOICES,
61-84,
(1988),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8822.pdf.
See DAAR, supra, note I, at 40.
E.g., Dana, supra note 6, at 360.
See Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of
Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1091, 1161 (1997).
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
Sarah Mortazavi, Note, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for
International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2262 (2012); see also Christine L.
Kerian, Article, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a
Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 11617 (1997).
Mortazavi, supra note 17, at 2264.
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common. 19 All forms of media outlets, newspapers, television news,
talk shows, and radio shows covered the news of the surrogate
mother who changed her mind about giving up her baby to the
biological father and literally "stole" the child and went into hiding
until she was finally found several months later, at which point the
child was returned to the Steams. 20 Yet even then, the drama was still
unfolding as people followed the court case that determined who
would be considered Baby M's parents. 21 By the time it was over in
1988, several state legislatures had already begun to consider how to
regulate situations where surrogates might be used. 22 In states where
the legislature had not yet acted, courts found that they had to address
the issue with no guidance. 23
Prior to 1978, when the use of in vitro fertilization became
possible, the only form of surrogacy available (now referred to as
traditional surrogacy) required the use of the gestational mother's
ovum. 24 This created a genetic connection between the gestational
carrier and the resulting child, which allowed courts to comfortably
identify the surrogate as the legal mother when disputes arose. 25
Once it became possible to fertilize an egg in the lab and place the
resulting zygote into a woman's uterus for gestation through in vitro

19.
20.

21.

22.

23.

24.
25.

See id. at 2262-64.
See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Baby M Will Become Angry Over Legal Fight, Mother Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1987, at Bl; Roger Rosenblatt, Baby M - Emotions for Sale,
TIME, Apr. 6, 1987, at 88; United Press lnt'l, Daughter Can't Testify for Surrogate
Mom
in Trial, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 7,
1987, available at
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1987 -02-07 /news/0 I 00460021_1_whitehead-babym-surrogate-mother. The story was even made into a TV movie. Baby M (ABC
Circle Films 1988), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094696/.
The final decision regarding custody was issued on February 3, 1988, almost two
years after Baby M was born, and approximately eighteen months after she was
returned to Mr. Steams. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, at 1234-35.
See LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2713 (2005) (originally enacted by Acts 1987 No. 583 §
I, 1987 La. Sess. Law Serv. 583 (West)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.851 (West
2011) (originally enacted by 1988 Pub. L. No. 199, § I, 1988 Mich. Legis. Serv. 199
(West)); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.287 (LexisNexis 2010) (originally enacted by
1987 Nev. Stat. 2049); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002) (originally enacted by
1983 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. (West)).
See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rei. Armstrong, 704
S.W.2d 209, 213-14 (Ky. 1986); Yates v. Keane, 457 N.W.2d 693 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990); In reAdoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813,818 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986);
In reAdoption of Reams, 557 N.E.2d !59, 162 (Ohio Ct. App. lOth Dist. 1989).
Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 97,98 (Supp. 2010).
!d.
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fertilization, gestational surrogacy became the more popular option. 26
Gestational surrogacy allows the surrogate to avoid any genetic
connection to the resulting child, which makes it easier for an
intended couple to be considered the legal parents. 27
States are free to allow or ban surrogacy arrangements, leading to a
good deal of disparity in the way such arrangements are treated. 28
When surrogacy first became a reasonable option, issues arose
regarding the distinction between providing a gestational service and
selling babies?9 Issues of whether payment for services was
appropriate, 30 enforceability of contracts,31 and resolution of disputes
involving custody and parentage caused some states to ban the
practice of using surrogate agreements altogether. 32 Other states
limited the compensation involved or included restrictions on the
terms of agreements. 33 The remaining states avoided the topic
completely, leaving the legality of the agreements in those
jurisdictions unclear. 34
Generally, compensation of surrogates is discouraged. 35 By
restricting payment to identifiable costs of the process and resulting
pregnancy, concerns about baby selling and exploitation of women
are avoided. 36 The issues of enforceability of contracts and parentage
determinations, though still not settled completely, have been well
debated and generally addressed either through legislation or court
decisions. 37 Though different from state to state, the individual
jurisdictional approach to basic surrogacy issues has become rather
apparent and settled by the jurisdictions that have addressed the
issues. 38

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at 98-99.
See id.
See id. at 101.
Cf Andrea B. Carroll, Reregulating the Baby Market: A Call for a Ban on Payment of
Birth-Mother Living Expenses, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 285, 290-94 (2011).
Cf id. at 293-94.
Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA.
L. REv. 2305, 2307-08 (1995). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and
Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL 'y 21 (1989).
See Spivack, supra note 24, at 101.
See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination ofLegal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REv. 835, 851 (2000).
Spivack, supra note 24, at 102.
See id. at 10 l.
See Carroll, supra note 29, at 310, 313.
See Spivack, supra note 24, at 101-11.
See id. at 101-02.
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Now that the use of surrogacy agreements has become an accepted
option for dealing with infertility problems, new, secondary issues
have begun to arise as more parties attempt to fit this service into
their own personal situations. The use of gestational surrogates has
opened doors for parties to add contract provisions for certain
situations that allow a more personalized determination of the legal
and social status of all involved. 39 Though a gestational surrogate is
not generally recognized as a legal parent, some contracts establish
the nature of the connection between the gestational surrogate, the
resulting child, and the intended parents. 40 These agreements often
involve sharing information about the child with the gestational
mother and may involve establishing some sort of visitation, making
the gestational surrogate a quasi-parent or at least a quasi-relative
who has some involvement with the resulting child. 41
Some gestational surrogates provide this service several times, and
in addition to the altruistic reasons for doing so, in states where some
compensation is allowed, the gestational surrogate is potentially

39.

40.
41.

See Sample Gestational Surrogacy Agreement, ALL ABOUT SURROGACY.COM,
http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/sample_ contracts/TScontract2.htm (last visited
June 31 ,2013).
See id.
An example of such contract provisions can be found in a sample contract provided by
AIIAboutSurrogacy.com. !d. The relevant language is:
11. Postpartum contact between the Genetic Father, resulting
offspring and Surrogate shall be upon the mutual agreement of the
parties with the best interest of the Child controlling it.
11.1. Without it consisting any alienation of Genetic Father'
rights as to the sole and exclusive custody, parental responsibility,
decision-making, care and control of the Child nor setting up base
for any claim from Surrogate to this effect, it is Genetic Father
intention to allow Surrogate to visit the Child freely, after having
previously set an appointment for such visit. All the visits shall be
in the presence of the Genetic Father unless permitted otherwise
by the Genetic Father.
11.2. Under no consideration will the Surrogate take the Child
from the custody of the Genetic Father or leave with the Child to
take him to a place different than the one where she was permitted
to visit him. Such visits shall not be construed as shared custody
visitation rights nor set base for any claim to such. At any time,
with consideration to the Child's well being and best interest,
Genetic Father may change or end the regimen of such visits.
11.3. Surrogate, agrees that in the best interest of the child she
will not form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship with
any child born pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.
!d.
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engaging in a business endeavor. 42 Like any other service-related
business, it seems reasonable for there to be incentives and
consequences involved in the provision of this service. However,
these issues have not yet been addressed through legislation or
appellate court decisions.
Another secondary issue arises when parties to the surrogacy
agreement are located or have obtained services in different
jurisdictions. Typical conflict-of-laws analysis is usually sufficient to
address concerns with various states, but many people use surrogates
from other countries as well. 43 For instance, India has a number of
surrogacy agencies that provide gestational surrogates for American
or European intended parents. 44 Recently, issues related to the
citizenship of the resulting child have caused unanticipated
complications for people using these services. 45
An additional issue is access to surrogacy agreements by parties
who are not heterosexual married couples. Most legislation has
limited surrogacy agreements to married couples, identifying them as
husband and wife. 46 Some, however, have been silent about who can
use a traditional surrogate, and at least one state, Florida, has separate
statutes relating to traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy,
with marital status as one of the criteria for which type of
arrangement is available. 47 Anyone can make use of a traditional
surrogate. 48 Only married heterosexual couples get the full benefit of
the statute related to gestational surrogates. 49 As this article will
demonstrate, there are very important benefits available through the
gestational surrogacy statute that are not available to those who
choose, or are restricted to, traditional surrogacy. 5°
42.
43.

44.

45.
46.

47.

48.
49.
50.

See Epstein, supra note 31, at 2318-19.
Clarissa Ward, More Americans Now Traveling to India for Surrogate Pregnancy,
ABC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/adoption-india-americansplan-surrogacy-abroad/story?id= l 0487880.
Isha Bhatia, Indian Surrogacy Industry Sets Take-Home-Baby Trend, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (June 2, 2013), http://www.dw.de/indian-surrogacy-industry-sets-take-homebaby-trend/a-16579078.
See, e.g., Marcelo de Alcantara, Surrogacy in Japan: Legal Implications for
Parentage and Citizenship, 48 FAM. CT. REv. 417 (2010).
Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case
Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 334 (2006).
Compare FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 742.15 (West 2010) (requiring marriage for gestational
surrogacy), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (West Supp. 2013) (identifying parties
without requiring any of them to be married).
See§ 63.213 (West Supp. 2013).
§ 742.15(1) (West 2010).
See infra Part IV.
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Applying Existing Law to Surrogacy Disputes

Faced with this new technological aspect of reproduction, several
courts attempted to address issues related to surrogacy arrangements
by applying existing legislative schemes. When the Kentucky
Attorney General attempted to revoke the charter of a corporation
that provided surrogacy services, the Kentucky Supreme Court was
forced to evaluate whether baby-selling statutes applied to businesses
providing surrogacy options. 51 In Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc. v. Commissioner ex rei. Armstrong, 52 the court eventually
decided that the statutes related to baby selling could not apply
because the agreements regarding the children occurred before
conception. 53 The court assumed that the traditional process for
terminating the mother's rights that was used in adoption proceedings
would apply, so the mother would have the opportunity to change her
mind after the birth of the child. 54 This essentially set out the
guidelines for surrogacy agreements, but the court invited the
legislature to take action. 55 The Kentucky legislature eventually
changed the rule announced in Surrogate Parenting when it outlawed
surrogacy agreements that involved compensation. 56
The New York Surrogate Court also invited legislative action since
it wanted to avoid judicially legislating on this issue. 57 Faced with
deciding the fate of a child born to a surrogate who had been paid
$10,000, and whether the contractual arrangement would be given
legal effect, the court declined to apply the existing adoption law
statutes, which prohibited payment in this situation. 58 Instead, it
reluctantly upheld the agreement, including the payment provisions,
indicating that since the legislature had not contemplated surrogacy
when it had enacted a ban on payment for adoption of a child, the
court could not legislate from the bench. 59

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.
59.

Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rei. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d
209, 210-ll (Ky. 1986).
Id.
Jd.at211.
!d. at 212-13.
Id. at 213-14.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 {West 2006).
See In reAdoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986)
("However, the court requests the legislature to review this serious problem in order to
determine whether statutory provisions should be made to allow or disallow the
payments requested herein and the practice of surrogate parenting.").
!d. at 814,817-18.
!d. at 817-18.
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C. Legislative Attempts to Regulate or Restrict Surrogacy
As states first began to enact legislation, there were four different
types of statutes considered. Some outlawed compensation to
surrogates but remained silent regarding voluntary agreements or the
rights of those involved. 60 Others outlawed contracts that involved
compensation to the surrogate and attempted to address other issues
for agreements that did not involve compensation. 61 A third category
outlawed surrogacy altogether, regardless of compensation, but still
went on to address such things as parentage, recognizing that whether
enforceable or not, there may be agreements that would result in
children whose status must be addressed. 62 Finally, there were
statutory attempts to exempt surrogacy from existing legislation on
adoption, but with no additional attempts to regulate the practice. 63

60.

61.

62.

63.

See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2713 (2005). Section A of this statute states: "A
contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely null and shall
be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy." !d.
Compare WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 2005) (banning surrogacy
agreements for compensation by stating: "No person, organization, or agency shall
enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate
parentage contract, written or unwritten, for compensation"), with id. § 26.26.260
(recognizing that surrogacy agreements without compensation would be valid and
would require parentage determinations: "If a child is born to a surrogate mother
pursuant to a surrogate parentage contract, and there is a dispute between the parties
concerning custody of the child ... ").
E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007) (holding unconstitutional in the case
Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)). This statute, enacted in
1989, stated:
A. No person may enter into, induce, arrange, procure or
otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract.
B. A surrogate is the legal mother of a child born as a result of a
surrogate parentage contract and is entitled to custody of that
child.
C. If the mother of a child bom as a result of a surrogate contract
is married, her husband is presumed to be the legal father of the
child. This presumption is rebuttable.
D. For the purposes of this section, 'surrogate parentage contract'
means a contract, agreement or arrangement in which a woman
agrees to the implantation of an embryo not related to that woman
or agrees to conceive a child through natural or artificial
insemination and to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to
the child.
!d.
E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.287 (LexisNexis 2010). This statute bans payment
for adoption, but paragraph 5 states: "The provisions of this section do not apply if a
woman enters into a lawful contract to act as a surrogate, be inseminated and give
birth to the child of a man who is not her husband." !d. At the time this statute was
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Louisiana was the first state to enact legislation governing
surrogacy. 64 The Louisiana statute made surrogacy contracts that
involved compensation void and unenforceable. 65
Soon after,
Washington made agreements involving compensation void and
unenforceable66 yet recognized that volunteer agreements could be
used that would require determinations of the rights and obligations
of the parties involved. 67 The Washington legislature additionally
mandated that existing laws regarding a child's best interests applied
to make these determinations. 68
At least initially, Nevada legislation suggested that surrogacy might
be viable but exempted it from statutes on adoption. 69 Arizona and
Michigan each attempted to outlaw surrogacy in any form yet also
included statutory provisions that established parentage rights and
custody for children born of such agreements. 70 Apparently, the
legislatures in these states recognized that they could prevent the
agreements from being enforceable by the court but might still have
to deal with the resulting children of agreements that did not involve
disputes between the contracting parties. 71 Finally, of the early
legislative efforts, Indiana enacted very specific provisions, making
certain portions of agreements unenforceable but allowing
agreements that followed guidelines enumerated in the statutes. 72

64.

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

enacted, there were no provisions for valid surrogacy agreements in Nevada. The
current statute that regulates such agreements was enacted in 1993. See id. § 126.045.
Dana R. Bennett, Surrogate Parenting, Nev. Legislative Council Bureau, Research
Div., Background Paper 88-2, available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/
Research/Publications/Bkground/BP88-02.pdf; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2713
(2005)) (enacted Sept. I, 1987).
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713A ("A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined
herein shall be absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to
public policy.").
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 26.26.230, 240.
See id. (establishing parentage and custody of a child born through surrogacy
arrangements).
See id. (establishing parentage and custody of a child born through surrogacy
arrangements).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 127.287.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.855, 859,
861 (West 2011).
See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (LexisNexis 2007), repealed by Pub. L. No. 1-1997, §
157. The former statute read:
CHAPTER
2.
SURROGATE
AGREEMENTS;
ENFORCEABILITY
§ 31-8-2-1. Agreements which may not be enforced.
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D. Model Legislation Efforts
By 1990, there were two model acts that addressed issues related to
surrogacy: The Model Surrogacy Act proposed by the American Bar
Association and the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act, drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 73 Each of these has evolved
and been incorporated into more comprehensive versions. 74
Originally, the Model Surrogacy Act eliminated the presumptive
maternity of the surrogate, ceding that decision to the surrogacy
contract itself. 75 It also authorized a fee for the surrogate and
addressed issues about informed consent. 76
The focus of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Reproduction Act was the status of the resulting child in relation to
the parents. 77 Broader than the Model Surrogacy Act, the Uniform
Children of Assisted Reproduction Act addressed relationships
created by any type of assisted reproduction. 78 Many of the
requirements included in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Reproduction Act mirrored those already in place for adoptions, such
as home studies and a guardian ad litem, to represent the best
interests of the resulting child or children. 79
The provisions of these two model acts, along with several other
model acts that attempted to clarify rights and obligations of parents

73.
74.
75.

76.
77.

78.
79.

The general assembly declares that it is against public policy to
enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires a
surrogate to do any of the following:
(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a child.
(2) Become pregnant.
(3) Consent to undergo or undergo an abortion.
(4) Undergo medical or psychological treatment or examination.
(5) Use a substance or engage in activity only in accordance with
the demands of another person.
(6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child.
(7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child.
(8) Consent to a stepparent adoption under IC 31-3-1.
Pub. L. No. 175-1988, § 1.
Linda S. Cioffredi, New Hampshire in Surrogacy: Making Way for the Future, 31
N.H. B.J. 189, 192-93 (1990).
See, e.g., UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002).
Cioffredi, supra note 73, at 192.
Id.
Id. at 193; Ann MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A
Constitutional Problem? The Married-Parent Requirement in the Uniform Status of
Children ofAssisted Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487,492-93 (1991).
See Cioffredi, supra note 73, at 192-93; Massie, supra note 77, at 489-90.
See Cioffredi, supra note 73, at 193.
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and children, were consolidated into the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA). 80 The amended version of the UPA treats children equally
regardless of their parents' marital status. 81 Article 8 addresses
gestational agreements. 82 The drafters recognized that there was no
consistency among the states about how to handle decisions related to
gestational surrogacy, so the section was created in a manner that
allowed states to eliminate this section without compromising the
provisions of the rest of the UP A. 83 Article 8 requires court approval
of surrogacy agreements84 and insures that children will be supported
even if the arrangements do not proceed as contemplated. 85 In a
significant departure from earlier acts, the 2002 amended version
eliminates the need for one of the intended parents to have a genetic
connection to the resulting child. 86
III. SURROGACY LEGISLATION TODAY
Today, those states that have surrogacy legislation run the gamut
from criminalizing surrogacy agreements87 to the types of
comprehensive regulation now part of the Uniform Parentage Act. 88
Legislatures and courts still grapple with three concerns: whether
there are differences related to traditional surrogacy or gestational
surrogacy, 89 whether the surrogate gets compensated for more than
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.
89.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

(2002).

/d. at prefatory note.

/d. art. 8.
/d. art. 8, intro. cmt.
See id. §§ 801-{)3.
See id. § 807.
/d. art. 8, intro. cmt.
See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 123 (McKinney 2012).
Any person or entity who or which induces, arranges or otherwise
assists in the formation of a surrogate parenting contract for a fee,
compensation or other remuneration or otherwise violates this
section, after having been once subject to a civil penalty for
violating this section, shall be guilty of a felony.
/d. § 123(2)(b).
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 168:B (LexisNexis 2010).
Traditional surrogacy involved the use of the surrogate mother's egg and the sperm of
the intended father or a donor. Gestational surrogacy requires that there be no genetic
connection to the surrogate mother. Hofman, supra note 1, at 451.
Surrogacy's permutations can include situations where:
• A surrogate serves solely as the gestational mother to a child
who is the genetic offspring of both intended parents (often called
"gestational surrogacy");
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the expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy, and whether the
intended parents must be married and heterosexual. 90
Most states restrict surrogacy agreements to married couples. 91 In
doing so, these states' legislatures have not explicitly explained why
they have made this choice. It is likely that this is a political movea way to appease those who believe that only married couples should
have children and to get support for this alternative means of doing
so, which may be a stretch for some with strong beliefs about
reproduction and marriage. 92 In fact, the Catholic Church does not
approve of the use of surrogacy even if the intended parents are
married. 93 Looking at the restriction to married couples as a
compromise may be an accurate explanation. For example, when the
Florida legislature enacted the initial legislation that addressed
surrogacy, the Preplanned Adoption statute, 94 two of the sponsors of
the bill reported on the process in an effort to assist others who might
be contemplating such a legislative effort. 95 The sponsors, both
physicians as well as legislators, described the process of garnering
support from various interested groups, such as the Florida Medical
Association, the Florida Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
and the Florida Society of Reproductive Endocrinologists. 96 Other
interested organizations that were not involved in the direct provision
of medical services related to surrogacy included the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Florida Catholic Conference. 97 In the initial
• A surrogate serves as both the genetic and the gestational mother
to a child who is the genetic offspring of the intended father (often
called "traditional surrogacy"); ....
90.
91.

92.
93.

94.
95.
96.
97.

!d.
!d. at 460.
Jamie L. Zuckerman, Comment, Extreme Makeover-Surrogacy Edition: Reassessing
the Marriage Requirement in Gestational Surrogacy Contracts and the Right to
Revoke Consent in Traditional Surrogacy Agreements, 32 NOVA L. REv. 661, 680
(2008).
Hofman, supra note I, at 460.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 631, Part Three, Section Two, Chapter Two,
Article 6, III, 2376 (1997) {"Techniques that entail the dissociation of husband and
wife, by the intrusion of a person other than the couple (donation of sperm or ovum,
surrogate uterus), are gravely immoral. These techniques {heterologous artificial
insemination and fertilization) infringe the child's right to be born of a father and
mother known to him and bound to each other by marriage. They betray the spouses'
'right to become a father and a mother only through each other."').
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.213 (West Supp. 2013).
See Angeli R. Maun eta!., The Passage of Florida's Statute on Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 84 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 889, 891 (1994).
See id. at 891.
See id.
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efforts to avoid strong opposition from the Catholic delegation, the
drafters and sponsors included many provisions that mirrored the
adoption process, including the requirement that the intended parents
be married. 98 Some of those requirements were later jettisoned from
the bill, but even when they were included, they appeased the
Catholic delegation only to the point of avoiding a strong
oppositional campaign. 99 In the end, that group still refused to
support the legislation. 100
Regardless of the reasons for distinguishing between married and
unmarried couples, those distinctions are common to most legislation
regarding surrogate agreements. 101 Creating distinctions such as
these where none should exist is unconstitutional discrimination. The
Florida statutory scheme provides a vivid example of this type of
discrimination.
IV. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARRIED COUPLES
AND INDIVIDUALS
Most states that have legislation regarding surrogacy restrict all
forms of surrogacy to married couples. 102 One group clearly
prohibited from this option is same-sex couples. 103 But unmarried
heterosexual couples are also prohibited from accessing these
arrangements. 104 Since the legislation does not single out only samesex couples, it is difficult to suggest that the legislation discriminates
against couples based on their gender. 105 If this were the case, the
Equal Protection analysis would likely allow for some enhanced level
of scrutiny to determine whether the discrimination was
constitutional. 106 But when left with rational basis review, one who
wishes to challenge these statutes must demonstrate that, in addition
to same-sex couples, regardless of their marital status, the unmarried
couples and individuals are similarly situated to the married couples,

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 891-92.
See id. at 892-93.
See id. at 893.
Zuckerman, supra note 91, at 680.
!d.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 742.13-15 (West 2010); § 63.213 {West Supp. 2013).
See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (identifying
heightened scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for claims of discrimination
based on sex).
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and the distinction between married or unmarried persons has no
legitimate purpose. 107

A.

An Example ofBlatant Discrimination

By enacting two alternative ways to use a surrogate carrier, Florida
has provided a clear basis for arguing that unmarried couples and
individuals, regardless of sexual orientation, are similarly situated to
married couples when it comes to the use of surrogate parentage
arrangements. 108 One of the most blatant examples of the distinctly
different ways intended parents are treated differently based on
marital status is the statutory scheme in Florida. 109 While most
scholars describe the Florida surrogacy statute as one that is limited
to married couples, llO Florida actually has two different statutes that
can apply to a surrogacy agreement depending on whether the parties
involved qualify under the statute.ll 1
1. Preplanned Adoption Act
Under Florida Statutes Annotated section 63.213, the Preplanned
Adoption Statute, anyone, regardless of their marital status, is eligible
to enter into a surrogacy agreement as long as the agreement
comports with the procedure set out in the statute. 112 This provision
can be used in either a traditional surrogacy arrangement or a
gestational surrogacy arrangement, as there is no requirement
delineating where the gametes originate in relation to the parties. 113
The Preplanned Adoption Statute provides a forty-eight hour window
after the birth of the child for the woman who gave birth to change
107. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that
the Equal Protection Clause requires that those who are similarly situated be treated
equally).
108. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 742.13-15 (West 2010); § 63.213 (West Supp. 2013).
109. §§ 742.13-15; § 63.213.
110. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 643 (2002).
"Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire and Virginia's statutes all contain provisions
requiring at least one of the intending parents to be a genetic parent of the child. In
addition, these statutes require that the intending parents be married to each other." !d.
The article goes on to briefly discuss the traditional surrogacy statute, but does not
explain that the traditional model can be used by unmarried intended parents. !d. at
643-47; see also Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 609, 629 (2011) ("[S]ome of the states which expressly permit surrogacy,
including Florida ... have closed off this avenue to unmarried people.").
Ill. §§ 742.13-15 (West 2010); 63.213 (West Supp. 2013).
112. § 63.213.
113. !d.
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her mind and keep the child. 114 As of July 1, 2012, this provision
only applies when the gestational carrier is genetically related to the
child. 115
In addition, the statute requires court approval of the "adoption" of
the child, using the standards outlined in the Florida adoption
statutes. 116 Until recently, this connection to the Florida adoption
statutes meant those in a same-sex relationship were implicitly
prohibited from meeting the qualifications since Florida did not allow
practicing homosexuals to adopt. 117 However, recently the ban on
homosexual adoption has been changed, and sexual orientation is no
longer a consideration in the adoption decision. 118 This change
eliminates the last restriction based on marital status or sexual
orientation. 119
Finally, this statute allows for any party to change his or her mind
throughout the entire term of the contract. 120 The result of the
application of this statute for many years was that the surrogate could
keep the child and be considered the legal mother, even if she had no
genetic link to the child. 121 So when a couple, married or not, used
this process and chose to use a gestational surrogate but provided an
embryo created using both of their gametes, they risked the chance
that the surrogate carrier would change her mind about relinquishing
the child and would keep it, regardless of her lack of genetic
connection and the couple's genetic contribution. 122

114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.
121.

122.

ld. § 63.213(2)(a).
ld.
See id. § 63.213(2)(c), (d).
Until the recent case of Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. Adoption of XXG, 45
So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), which found Florida Statute Annotated §
63.042(3) unconstitutional, homosexuals were banned from adopting.
See id. at 91-92.
See§ 63.042(3) (West Supp. 2013), invalidated by Fla. Dept. of Children & Families,
45 So. 3d 79.
§ 63.213(2)(i) ("[T]he agreement may be terminated at any time by any of the
parties.").
The Preplanned Adoption statute contains no requirement that the gestational mother
provide the egg, so even though there is a separate statute that addresses only
gestational surrogacy, parties could choose to use a contract that conforms to the
Preplanned Adoption statute instead, thereby creating a situation where the intended
parent or parents provided the gametes or embryo and the gestational mother chose to
rescind the agreement and keep the resulting child.
See§ 63.213(2)(a), (e) (West 2012), amended by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213(2)(a), (e)
(West Supp. 2013).
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Under the new provisions of the Preplanned Adoption Statute,
effective July 1, 2012, those who choose to use their own egg 123 will
be treated differently than those who rely on the gestational carrier to
provide the egg. This will eliminate the odd potential of the
gestational carrier retaining her rights to a child who has no genetic
connection to her but has a genetic connection to at least one if not
both of the intended parents. Simultaneously, however, the revised
legislation discriminates against anyone who is unable to provide an
egg and chooses to use the carrier's egg. A couple, married or not,
who chooses to use the gestational carrier's egg (traditional
surrogacy) runs the risk that the carrier will opt to retain her rights to
the child. 124 The same distinction between "traditional surrogacy"
and "gestational surrogacy" applies to all who use the provisions
outlined by this statute. Consequently, in isolation, the statute
appears to treat all equally. While this change seems appropriate
since it treats all parties alike, the existence of an alternative that
avoids this result, available only to married couples, highlights the
way married and unmarried couples are treated differently. 125
Looking more broadly at all of the options for surrogate
arrangements available in Florida demonstrates a clear discriminatory
distinction. Only married heterosexual couples have the option of
following the process described in the Gestational Surrogacy
provisions of the Florida statutes. 126
Unmarried couples and
individuals are limited to the Preplanned Adoption provisions,
including the requirement to comply with adoption standards, and the
option of either party to terminate the agreement prior to the birth of
the child. 127 Married couples may choose to proceed under either the
Preplanned Adoption.statute or the Gestational Surrogacy Act. 128
2. Gestational Surrogacy Act
At first glance, the existence of the Preplanned Adoption statute
does not appear to treat people differently based on their marital
status, and now that Florida adoption laws are no longer excluding
homosexuals, it does not prohibit surrogacy based on sexual
123. When a surrogate contributes none of the genetic material the process is referred to as
gestational surrogacy. If the surrogate carrier also contributes the egg, the process is
referred to as traditional surrogacy. See Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and
the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 465, 474 (2006).
124. See§ 63.213(1)(a), (2)(a), (e) (West Supp. 2013).
125. See discussion of Florida Surrogacy Act infra Part IV.A.2.
126. § 742.15(1) (West 2010).
127. § 63.213(2)(i) (West 2012).
128. § 63.213 (West 2012); § 742.15(1) (West 2010).
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orientation. 129 In isolation, it does not discriminate as currently
written. 130 However, the 2012 Legislature amended this statute. 131
The amendments eliminate the ability of a surrogate carrier to opt to
keep the resulting child if she is a true gestational surrogate. 132
Though this improves the statute by eliminating such a drastic option,
and makes clear that all intended parents can use a gestational
surrogacy arrangement, it does not address the other differences that
demonstrate bias toward those who are married. 133 The potential for
differing treatment arises by virtue of the fact that the legislature has
also enacted another statute that deals exclusively with gestational
surrogacy. 134 Under Florida Statutes Annotated § 742.13 et seq., a
surrogacy arrangement where at least one of the intended parents has
contributed genetic material and the surrogate has no genetic
connection to the resulting child (a scenario that can potentially arise
under the Preplanned Adoption statutes as well) is subject to an
expedited and non-adversarial process to affirm parental rights. 135 As
long as the surrogate has no genetic connection to the resulting child,
and at least one of the intended parents does have a genetic
connection, the gestational carrier cannot have any parental rights. 136
She must immediately relinquish her rights to the child upon its
birth, 137 and the intended parents are able to obtain an expedited order
from the court affirming their rights as parents and naming them on
the birth certificate. 138 There is no need for a long process and no
application of the adoption standards to the determination. 139 Instead
of a waiting period when the birth mother can change her mind, as in
the Florida adoption statutes 140 or the Preplanned Adoption Statute, 141

See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
See supra text accompanying note 115.
See discussion supra Part IV .A.1.
See§ 63.213(1)(a), (2)(a), (e) (West Supp. 2013).
See§ 63.213(6)(h) (West Supp. 2013).
See§ 742.13-18.
See§742.16.
See§ 742.15 (3)(c), (e).
§ 742.15(3)(c).
§ 742.16(1), (8).
See § 63.213(2) (West Supp. 2013) (outlining Florida's statutory adoption
requirements).
140. See§ 63.082 (4)(a), (b) ("(a) [C]onsent to an adoption shall not be executed before the
birth of the minor. (b) A consent to the adoption of a minor who is to be placed for
adoption may be executed by the birth mother 48 hours after the minor's birth or the
day the birth mother is notified in writing, ... that she is fit to be released from the
licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is earlier.").

129.
130.
13 1.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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the gestational mother has no option to claim the child. 142 Rather
than an approval process that might involve the type of searching
inquiry that courts use when evaluating adoptive parents, 143 the
Gestational Surrogacy Statute simply requires the court to determine
whether the terms of the contract have been met and that one of the
intended parents has a genetic connection to the child. 144
While Florida provides an option for unmarried couples where
some other states do not, the significantly higher risks associated with
the only option available to non-married couples highlights the
blatant discrimination against non-married individuals and couples in
a way that the other states do not. 145 Yet the same type of
discrimination is created by states that limit surrogacy arrangements
to married couples. 146 Though non-married couples have the option
141. See § 63.213(l)(b) (West 2012) (prohibiting arrangements from "[c]onstitut[ing]
consent of a mother to place her child for adoption until 48 hours following birth"); §
63.213(2)(e) (requiring an agreement contain the acknowledgment of the intended
parents that "they may not receive custody or the parental rights under the agreement
if the volunteer mother terminates the agreement or if the volunteer mother rescinds
her consent to place her child for adoption within 48 hours after birth").
142. See§ 742.15(3)(c) (West 2010) (providing that except when neither of the intended
parents is genetically connected to the child, "the gestational surrogate agrees to
relinquish any parental rights upon the child's birth and to proceed with the judicial
proceedings prescribed under section 742.16").
143. Florida statue provides:
The preliminary home study must include, at a minimum:
(a) An interview with the intended adoptive parents;
(b) Records checks of the department's central abuse registry and
criminal records correspondence checks under s. 39.0138 through
the Department of Law Enforcement on the intended adoptive
parents;
(c) An assessment of the physical environment of the home;
(d) A determination of the financial security of the intended
adoptive parents;
(e) Documentation of counseling and education of the intended
adoptive parents on adoptive parenting;
(f) Documentation that information on adoption and the adoption
process has been provided to the intended adoptive parents;
(g) Documentation that information on support services available
in the community has been provided to the intended adoptive
parents; and
(h) A copy of each signed acknowledgment of receipt of
disclosure required by s. 63.085.
§ 63.092(3) (West 2012); see also § 63.125 (West 2012) (explaining requirements of
final home study).
144. § 742.16(6) (West 2010).
145. See discussion infra Part IV.D.l.
146. See Storrow, supra note 110, at 643.
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of creating families through adoption or a female partner's use of
donated sperm, additional legal steps for both parties to become legal
parents are required, which also means that additional scrutiny by the
courts is required. 147 But it also means that these states allow nonmarried individuals and couples to build their families in nontraditional manners. 148 So the discrimination arises because of the
limitations on the types of non-traditional, family-building options
available. 149
B.

Justification for Discrimination

As noted in Part II, in the early 1990s, when surrogacy was just
beginning to be legislatively regulated, the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Aceso provided a model for state
legislatures to use as they considered legislation related to surrogacy.
The express purpose of the Uniform Act was to define the legal status
of children. 151 The act provided two options for states to address
surrogacy. 152 One was a complete ban; the other established specific
and rigorous requirements designed to "protect the 'rights, security
and well-being' of affected children" and to "provide a child with
two legal parents." 153 The requirements suggested by the Uniform
Act included the requirement that the intended parents be a male and
female, and married to each other. 154 The requirement that intended
parents be married had the potential to bring up questions about
whether states could limit this reproductive option to only married
couples, and by extension, whether there was a fundamental right to
procreation outside of marriage. 155 Most of the argument for the
constitutionality of the distinction was based on the state's interest in
preserving the marital family, traditional family life, and "historical
notions of morality." 156
As the legislation was implemented in various states, scholars
discussed potential challenges to the constitutionality of the
legislative distinction based on the Due Process and Equal Protection

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982).
See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.C-D.
Massie, supra note 77, at 489; see also discussion supra Part II.D.
Massie, supra note 77, at 490.
!d. at 490, 495.
!d. at 490.
See id. at 508.
!d. at 509.
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provlSlons of the Constitution. 157 When evaluating the potential
legislation under the Due Process Clause, the statute need only meet
the rational basis test, since there are no status distinctions that trigger
a higher standard of review. 158 Proponents of restricting the access to
surrogacy arrangements to married couples argue that the state's
interest in providing a child with a family that "include[s] two
parents, a man and a woman, who are married to each other" 159 serves
the best interests of the child and meets the rational basis test. 160 In
fact, at the time the Uniform Act was being drafted, proponents
argued that this reason would also meet the heightened scrutiny test,
since serving the best interests of children rises to the level of a
compelling state interest. 161 The argument continues by recognizing
that requiring a heterosexual married couple at the time of the birth
does not guarantee that the same family dynamic will remain as the
child grows up. 162 Nor does it guarantee that the married couple
requirement necessarily leads to a safe and supportive family
environment; but the requirement that the child at least begin life in a
situation like this was considered, by at least some, to be justification
for the restriction to heterosexual married couples. 163
This same reason, that a heterosexual married couple as a parental
unit serves the best interest of the resulting child, is used to support
the argument that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by this
statutory scheme. 164 This argument requires determining whether
married couples and unmarried couples who want to use surrogacy
are similarly situated. 165 The obvious difference is that one couple is
legally recognized as a unit and the other is not, but this is not a
legitimate reason to distinguish between married or unmarried
couples who want to build families. 166 Under the current statutory
system in Florida, it is difficult to suggest that married and unmarried
couples, or even single individuals, are situated differently in terms of
abilities to create families. 167 All can adopt. 168 All can use various

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See, e.g., id. at 499.
!d. at 51 0; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996).
Massie, supra note 77, at 510-11.
Jd.
See id. at 511.
Jd.atSll-12.
See id.
Seeid.at517.
ld. at 515.
Seeid.at517.
See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.213 (West 2012); § 742.15 (West 2010).
See§ 63.213 (West 2012).
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assisted reproductive technologies like sperm-donation and IVF .169
All can enter into surrogate carrier arrangements. 17° Consequently, in
terms of building families, couples, married or not, and individuals
are similarly situated. 171
C.

Equal Protection Analysis

Evaluating whether legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause
requires initially determining the level of scrutiny to apply. 172 Laws
affecting fundamental rights or targeting suspect classes, such as
groups identified by race, gender, or alienage, are entitled to
heightened scrutiny. 173 All other distinctions are evaluated using
rational basis review. 174
Though the right to procreate is a fundamental right, 175 it is unclear
whether that right extends to the use of alternative reproductive
technologies and the involvement of third parties. 176 Until the use of
alternative forms of procreation is specifically included within the
fundamental right to procreate, it is more appropriate to consider that
such use does not trigger the heightened scrutiny based on its
potential as a fundamental right. 177 In this instance, it does not
matter. Even under a rational basis review the statutory scheme is
unconstitutional.
Rational basis review asks whether a "legislative classification ...
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." 178 Though the
rational basis review is extremely deferential, there must be some
relationship between the "classification adopted and the object to be
attained." 179 Generally, legislation does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause if it "advance[s] a legitimate government interest,
even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a
particular group, or of the rationale for it seems tenuous." 180

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See§ 742.14 (West 2010).
See§742.15.
See Massie, supra note 77, at 517.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,470 (1985).
/d. at 440.
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
See Massie, supra note 77, at 516.
See id. at 526.
Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631 (1996).
/d. at 632.
/d.

636

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Most legislation survives rational basis scrutiny. 181
Even
legislation that creates incidental disadvantages is constitutional if it
also has legitimate public policy reasons supporting it. 182 But
enactments that carve out a specific class of citizens and provide that
class with a disfavored legal status "raise the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected." 183 For instance, in Romer v. Evans 184 Amendment
2, the effort to remove legal protections regarding discriminatory
practices from a single class of citizens-homosexuals-lacked any
rational relationship to a state interest and was therefore invalid. 185 In
another example, Proposition 8 in California was also found to have
violated the Equal Protection Clause by removing the ability of gays
and lesbians to obtain marriages and to refer to the committed
partnership that had all of the rights and obligations of traditional
marriage as a "marriage." 186 Unlike Amendment 2 in Romer, which
was broad and affected many different situations, Proposition 8
affected one specific right, "the right to use the designation of
'marriage' to describe a couple's officially recognized
relationship." 187 Despite the precise nature of the disability imposed
on the group by Proposition 8, it still worked a "meaningful harm"
that "must be justified by some legitimate state interest." 188 In fact,
the Perry court found the precise nature of the harm made the
legislation even more troublesome. 189 Both Amendment 2 and
Proposition 8 required the reviewing courts to consider whether a
legitimate state interest existed, and if not, to "infer that [the
enactments were] enacted with only the constitutionally illegitimate
basis of 'animus toward the class it affects. "' 190

181. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REv. 357, 357 (1999) ("These cases
are sufficiently rare to stand out as unusual, but they do exist. [From 1971 to 1996],
the Court ... decided ten such cases, while during the same time period, it ha[d]
rejected rational basis arguments on one hundred occasions.").
182. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
183. !d. at 634.
184. !d.
185. !d. at 635.
186. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1095 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded by
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct 2652 (2013).
187. Id. at 1081.
188. Id
189. !d.
190. Id. at 1082 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
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D. Justifications Break Down as Societal Values Shift
The desire to protect the best interest of the resulting children, by
providing them with parents who are male and female and married to
each other, may have been legitimate as new ways of family building
first started to appear in the early 1990s. 191 Without the experience of
observing alternative family structures over a significant period of
time, there was not enough evidence to support the assertion that
these alternative forms of family structures were not harmful to
children, and could also be in the best interest of the resulting child. 192
Though this distinction may have made sense at one point in our
history, as family-building alternatives such as adoption, sperm
donation to singles, and gay and lesbian parents raising children of
their own or their partners became more common, and traditional
surrogacy arrangements became available to unmarried individuals,
the argument that children's interests were harmed by the lack of two
heterosexual married parents became more difficult to support. 193
Since there is no protected class or fundamental right involved, the
legislature can regulate the different forms of family building
differently as long as the regulation is reasonable in light of the
legislative purpose. 194 On its face, the statute that restricts the use of
surrogacy arrangements to married couples only was a reasonable
way to protect the best interests of the resulting children-at least as
those interests were viewed at the time of the institution of these
statutes-but that is no longer the case. 195

191. See generally Gregory Acs & Sandi Nelson, CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE AND
CHILD WELL-BEING: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S
FAMILIES 1, 4 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
311025_family_ structure.p.df (presenting an analysis of changing family structures
including findings that cohabitation, a growing familial structure in the 1990s, is not
as beneficial to children as is a marital home).
192. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 822 (11th
Cir. 2004) (explaining that the legislature could rationally conclude that a significant
difference exists between heterosexual and homosexual households); In re Opinion of
the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987) ("Although opponents of the bill have cited
a number of studies that find no correlation between a homosexual orientation of
parents and the sexual orientation of their children, the source of sexual orientation is
still inadequately understood and is thought to be a combination of genetic and
environmental influences.").
193. In fact, some previous gay marriage opponents have since changed their opinion
based upon children's interests. See Mark Oppenheimer, In Shift, Activist Enlists
Same-Sex Couples in a Pro-Marriage Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,2013, at Al9.
194. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
19 5. See discussion infra Part IV .D .1.
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1. Marriage and the Best Interests of the Children
Much of the argument about the best interests of the children is
based on public policy that emphasized traditional, heterosexual
marriages as the optimum situation for raising children. 196 In the
early 1990s, some states still prohibited cohabitation, 197 and no state
provided those who cohabited with the same legal protections that
were available to married couples. 198 This lack of legal recognition
suggested that children of unmarried couples were more at risk of
losing the support of one parent because the cohabiting couple was
more likely to separate and the legal rights between the couple were
too tenuous to provide the child with the same type of support that a
child of divorced parents received. 199 The rationale for the distinction
appears to be the imposition of a moral duty-an individual moral
obligation to be married in order to create a family, because the act of
creating a family has an effect on others, namely the resulting
members of the family. 200 Alternatively, this distinction between
married and unmarried parents could be supported by the idea that
legislation should reflect society's general moral values, and society
(at least in part) valued marriage as the mechanism for building
families. 201 At the time, the distinction may have been appropriate.
If the legislative purpose for restricting surrogacy to married couples
was to serve the best interests of the resulting children because the
state provided more support to married couples, the two groups were

196. See discussion supra Part N.B.
197. For example, in 1990, Florida Statute section 798.02 addressed "[l]ewd[] and
lascivious behavior," stating: "If any man and woman, not being married to each
other, lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together, or if any man or woman,
married or unmarried, engages in open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior,
they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree .... " FLA. STAT. ANN.§
798.02 (West 2010). In the same year, Idaho had similar language in section18-6604:
"Lewd cohabitation.-lf any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall
live and cohabit together as man and wife, or shall lewdly and notoriously associate
together, such man or woman is guilty of a misdemeanor." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 186604 (1986) (repealed 1994). Georgia criminalized the same behavior, but defmed it
as fornication: "Fornication. An unmarried person commits the offense offomication
when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with another person and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished as for a misdemeanor." GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-6-18 (2011),
invalidated by In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 444 (Ga. 2003).
198. See Massie, supra note 77, at 527. It was not until the advent of civil unions that
states began to extend protections and benefits of marriage to couples who were
unmarried.
199. See id.
200. !d. at 509.
201. See Oppenheimer, supra note 193.
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not similarly situated for the purpose of Equal Protection analysis. 202
Though this may have been a reasonable conclusion in the early
1990s, when much of this legislation was being enacted, it no longer
holds true today.
Today the only distinction between married and unmarried couples
involves a different process and differing levels of risk, so the
argument that restricting this family-building option to only married
couples to serve the best interests of the resulting child fails
completely. 203 When a married couple can engage a gestational
surrogate who will never have any rights to the resulting child and
will have to immediately turn the child over to the intended parents
with no opportunity to make a choice to keep the child, 204 yet an
unmarried couple can only engage the services of a surrogate if they
are willing to take the chance that the surrogate will change her mind
and keep the child/05 or that the court will determine, through a much
more rigorous review of the couple's qualifications to be parents, that
they are unsuitable/06 the two similarly situated couples are treated
differently. This different treatment appears to be based only on
ideas about morality related to individual choices about sexual
interactions, a characteristic that is not reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest. Both couples are trying to build a family by
using a surrogate. Both are allowed to do so under the statutory
scheme. Yet the unmarried couple must assume more risk that the
surrogate will be allowed to keep the child and the couple will be
subjected to a much more rigorous and invasive review of their home
situation before being allowed to proceed. 207 The argument that
preventing unmarried couples from having children through
surrogacy because of the best interests of the children cannot exist if
the unmarried couple actually can engage the services of a surrogate,
just with additional process and risk. 208
2. Genetic Connections
One additional reason for the distinction might be the desire to
maintain some type of genetic connection between the parent or
parents and the resulting child, or to at least give that connection
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See discussion supra Part IV.C.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 742.15(2)(c) (West 2010).
See§ 63.213(1)(b) (West2012).
See§ 63.213(1)(a), (b).
See§ 63.213(2)(c).
See§ 63.213; §§ 742.13(2), 742.15.
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some consideration, especially if one of the genetic contributors
would not be involved in the upbringing of the child. 209 The original
pre-planned adoption legislation210 was drafted when the only option
being considered was traditional surrogacy, so the best interest of the
child involved looking at two genetic parents who were never going
to be in the same household. 211 Today, gestational surrogacy
arrangements are the preferred model, meaning the gestational
mother has no genetic connection to the resulting child, and the
intended parents may or may not have a genetic connection. 212
Therefore, the best-interest analysis must consider more than just
who the biological parents are, and instead look at who is most
appropriate to be named the legal parents.
When legislators, courts, and other policy makers consider how to
handle parentage determinations and availability of surrogacy
arrangements, they appear to put a good deal of emphasis on genetic
consanguinity. 213 For instance, despite the fact that it is medically
possible to provide an embryo using a donor egg and donor sperm, or
to use the donated embryo of a couple who did not intend to be
donors until after the embryos were created, most surrogacy
regulation requires at least one of the intended parents be genetically
related to the resulting child. 214 Though potentially arising from a
concern that no one would want to claim the child once it was born,
leaving it in the custody of the state, this emphasis on genetic
consanguinity is not present in other parentage determinations. 215
Family building that occurs through adoption completely ignores
any requirement for genetic connections. 216 In fact, for a long time it

See Hofman, supra note 1, at 451-53,460.
§ 63.213.
See id.
See Spivack, supra note 24, at 98-99.
Compare Hofman, supra note 1, at 451-53, 460 (theorizing that genetic relation
underlies many courts' approaches), with Spivack, supra note 25, at 97, 99, 101-06
(discussing other approaches, including contractual and intent-based theories, to
resolving legal disputes about parentage).
214. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 168-B:l (XII) (2010).
215. See Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the Game: Parentage Determinations when
Assisted Reproductive Technology is Used to Create Families, 62 ARK. L. REv. 29,
34-38 (2009); Linda S. Anderson, Just Because You Don't Want Kids Doesn't Mean I
Can't Have Them: How Clarifying Definitions of "Parent" and "Procreate" Can
Prevent the Indefinite Storage of Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv.
231, 240-41 (2010).
216. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 1 (2004) (suggesting that although states' methods of
defining adoption vary, there is agreement about its general characteristics).
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
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was impossible to adopt your own child, 217 because adoption
contemplates creating a family where no genetic connections
existed. 218 Even traditional family building with a heterosexual
married couple puts little emphasis on genetic connections.Z 19 A
child born to a married couple is presumed to be the child of the
husband and wife, even if there is not a genetic connection to one
parent or the other. 220
Despite this lack of emphasis on genetics in other options, the
distinction present in the two contrasting Florida surrogacy schemes
is at least somewhat based on where the genetic connections exist and
where they are absent. 221 The gestational surrogacy statute requires
genetic connections with at least one parent, 222 while the preplanned
adoption statute does not include this requirement. 223 Married
couples can more easily build a family with no genetic connection to
one or the other of them than unmarried couples. 224 Unmarried
couples and single individuals are left with a regulatory scheme that
allows for the gestational mother to have no connection to the
resulting child, but runs the risk that the gestational mother will opt to
keep the child,225 whereas married couples have options that ignore
any genetic ties to the surrogate and prohibit the possibility that the
gestational mother will keep the child. 226
In order to meet constitutional muster, there must be a rational
basis for the distinction between married and unmarried potential
217.

218.
219.

220.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

As same-sex couples began to find creative ways to build families, some individuals
would have a child, relinquish their right to the child, and then try to adopt the same
child as a couple. This was generally not allowed, so states began allowing secondparent adoptions, even though there was still a parent who had not relinquished rights
to the child. See generally In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002);
Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93 (2000); Ann K.
Wooster, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 6! A.L.R. 6th I
(2011).
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), adoption.
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117, 119-20 (1989) (explaining the
history and rationale behind California's statutory presumption that a child born to a
married woman living with her husband is a child of that marriage).
See id. at 128-29; Linda S. Anderson, Protecting Parent-Child Relationships:
Determining Parental Rights of Same-Sex Parents Consistently Despite Varying
Recognition of Their Relationship, 5 PIERCE L. REV. I, 7-8 (2006).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (West 2012); §§ 742.13(2), 742.15 (West 2010).
§ 742.13(2)(West 2010).
§ 63.213 (West Supp. 2013).
See Zuckerman, supra note 91, at 676-77.
See§ 63.213(2)(e) (West Supp. 2013).
§ 742.15(3)(c).

642

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

parents. 227 The best interests of the children is not a valid reason
because unmarried couples can use the more invasive statute to create
a family. 228 Genetic consanguinity is not a valid reason because the
two statutes provide alternatives that allow situations with no genetic
connection to the resulting children. 229 The only rationale left is to
enforce societal views about morality--especially moral judgments
about the appropriateness of marriage for families, as opposed to
alternative family situations. 230 This reason alone is not enough to
make the regulation constitutional. 231
V. MORALITY AS THE ONLY REMAINING RATIONALE
If the state's rationale for distinguishing between married couples
and unmarried couples cannot be based on the best interests of the
resulting children, or the need for genetic consanguinity, then the
only other reason that might account for the difference in treatment is
to maintain "traditional family life"232 or to protect "historical notions
of morality." 233 Though at one time courts appeared to accept
morals-based justifications for decisions, these decisions were never
based exclusively on such justifications. Legislating based on
morality alone is inappropriate because there is no way to identify
whose morals are correct.

A.

Legislation and Morality

The connection between societal views of morality and the law has
long been assumed. 234 Yet these two concepts, while similar because
227.
228.
229.

230.
231.

232.
233.
234.

Massie, supra note 77, at 510.
§ 63.213 (West Supp. 2013).
Compare§ 742.15(3)(e) (West 2010) (providing that the surrogate assumes parental
rights and responsibilities for the child if it is determined that neither member of the
commissioning couple is the genetic parent of the child), with § 63.213(6)(d)-(e)
(West Supp. 2013) (implying that a genetic relation between the child and either of
the intended parents is not required).
Zuckerman, supra note 91, at 681.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) ("Indeed, we have never held that
moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale
under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of
persons.").
Massie, supra note 77, at 509.
/d.
KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 161 (1987) (describing
natural law as "the longstanding position in moral and legal theory that human law is
in some sense derived from moral norms that are universally valid and discoverable·
by reasoning about human nature or true human goods"); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1487 (1987) (arguing that
courts interpret statutes in light of existing social norms rather than societal norms
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they each seek to guide behavior, are not identical. 235 In fact, law is a
subset, or at least partially a subset, of morality. 236 Though law
reflects society's views of morality, not all decisions related to
appropriate moral behavior or enforcement of morality are
appropriate to be incorporated into the law. 237 Most scholars
distinguish between enforcement of public morals and enforcement
of private morals, suggesting that public morals involve actions that
have a negative effect on others, whereas private morals are those
that involve actions that are individual in nature, often related to
sexual behavior. 238
In his series of lectures at Stanford University, noted legal
philosopher H.L.A. Hart distinguished between morality that protects
against harm to others and sexual morality, stating that "society could
not exist without a morality which mirrored and supplemented the
law's proscriptions of conduct injurious to others. But there is ... no
evidence to support, and much to refute, the theory that those who

235.
236.

237.

238.

existing at the time of enactment); Stanley Mosk, The Common Law and the Judicial
Decision-Making Process, II HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 36 (1988) (describing the
evolution of the common law and its ability to reflect societal changes). This
assumption is evident by the assertion of connections between morality and law
without the need for citation, even by Supreme Court Justice Scalia. See City of Erie
v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 644-48 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law's Limited Domain Confronts Morality's
Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1585-86 (2007).
!d. at 1581 ("[L]egal incorporation of morality presents the odd case of the subset
incorporating the larger set, and thus suggests the peculiar image of a mouse
attempting to swallow a python.").
See id.; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before
and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1300-04 (2004) (discussing the
influence of morality on the law after Lawrence's disavowal of morality as a
legitimate basis for legislation); Gregory Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals
Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious
Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. I, 30 (2006) (distinguishing public morality from
private morality and suggesting that "public good," rather than morality in general, is
the appropriate role of legislation).
See, e.g., G. Marcus Cole, What Is the Government's Role in Promoting Morals? . ..
Seriously?, 31 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 77, 79 (2008) (using the terms morality of
aspiration and morality of duty, where morality of duty involves the "basic duty to
respect the person and property of others"); Timothy W. Reinig, Comment, Sin,
Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and Values in Democratic Law and Policy,
38 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 880 (1990).
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deviate from conventional sexual morality are in other ways hostile to
society. "239
Morality, encompassing both private and public, describes what
one ought to do, and is grounded in religious teachings?40 Even
within the concept of morality, it is possible to have conflicting views
about what constitutes proper behavior. 241 In fact, there is continuing
debate and disagreement about what morality requires about all sorts
of things, which provides the ultimate rationale for law and the legal
system-to settle disputes about what morality requires in specific
instances. 242
However, the proper role of the government in promoting or
enforcing morals is subject to much debate. 243 There appears to be
strong agreement that standards of morality concerning harm to
others or others' property ar~ legitimate reasons for the government
to get involved in enforcement through legislation. 244 Laws relating
to murder, assault, robbery, and trespass fall into this category. 245
The harder question is whether areas of morality that might be
described as virtues are proper subjects for legislation. 246 Until the
time of King Henry VIII, who took control of the Church of England
in the 16th century/47 morality related to virtues was the domain of
the ecclesiastical courts. 248
Today, in a system that imposes
regulations on individuals with vastly different belief systems,
continuing to use legislation to impose certain moral imperatives may
impinge on others' freedom to hold alternative beliefs about
morality. 249
While regulating public morality may still be appropriate because
doing so protects people from harm created by the choices of others
and respects basic human dignity, regulating private morality-what
we each choose to do in private, whether virtuous or not-becomes
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

248.
249.

H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 50-51 (1963).
Cole, supra note 238, at 78.
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 236, at 1583.
/d. at 1583-84.
Cole, supra note 238, at 77.
/d. at 79.
/d. at 77, 79.
/d. at 79.
King Henry VII ruled England from 1509 to 1547. During the 1530s and 1540s he
expanded royal authority at the expense of ecclesiastical authority. See A.F.
POLLARD, Biography of King Henry VIII of England, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, 289 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1910), available at http://
www.luminarium.org/renlit/tudorbio.htm.
Cole, supra note 238, at 81.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
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significantly more complicated in a world where we are expected to
respect everyone's right to practice their own religion and where
tolerance of those who are different from us is expected in all realms
oflife. 250
B. Public Morality vs. Private Morality
Some restrictions on private morality are appropriate because the
behaviors being restricted can lead to potentially harmful effects on
others?51 Legislation that is designed to protect public morals
includes such things as restrictions on gambling/52 the attempt to
prohibit the use of alcohol/53 and the outlawing of prostitution. 254
Each of these attempts to regulate individual behavior has a basis in
both private and public morals. 255 The restrictions on individual
behavior are likely to discourage behavior that is commonly
250.

251.
252.

253.
254.

255.

See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 234, at 26 (asserting that "reasons relating
exclusively to one's own welfare do not establish what, morally, one ought to do;
people are free morally not to pursue their own welfare").
See HART, supra note 239, at 50-51.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 330 (West 2012). In fact, Title 9 of the California Penal
Code is titled specifically, "Of Crimes Against the Person Involving Sexual Assault,
and Crimes Against Public Decency and Good Morals," and addresses things such as
sexual offenses crimes against children, spousal abuse, obscenity, and gambling. See
also KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 528.010 (West 2006). The commentary to the Kentucky
statutes restricting gambling state:
The principal concept of the entire gambling chapter is to punish
those who make a business or profession of gambling rather than
the player who makes the business possible. Subsection (1),
advancing gambling, and subsection (8), profiting from gambling,
define the basic proscribed gambling activities. "Advancing
gambling activity" refers to the activities of the operator of a
gambling enterprise as well as the person who sets up a game,
furnishes equipment, provides facilities for gambling or entices
others to patronize gambling activities. A "player" as defined in
subsection (7), does not advance gambling activity. "Profiting
from gambling activity" is intended to reach the entrepreneurs
who receive money or other profit, other than as a player,
pursuant to an understanding or agreement to that effect.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 528.010 Kentucky Crime Commission/LRC Commentary
1974 (West 2006).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST., amend. XVIII (in effect from Jan. 16, 1919, until ratification of
the 21st Amendment in 1933).
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 53a-82 (West 2012); D.C. CODE§ 22-2701 (Supp.
2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.07 (West Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
207.030 (LexisNexis 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1029 (West 2012); TENN.
CODE ANN.§ 39-13-512 (Supp. 2012).
See, e.g., Ballock v. State, 73 Md. 1, 7-8, 20 A. 184, 186 (1890).
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considered lacking in virtue, but more importantly, the restrictions
protect others who may be harmed by this lack of virtuous
behavior. 256 Legislation to restrict gambling has been justified by the
need to protect families from the financial trouble that often
accompanies excessive gambling. 257 Prohibition was designed to
discourage and eliminate the potentially harmful behavior that can
occur when one is intoxicated. 258 Banning prostitution protects those
who would participate from various sexually transmitted diseases, as
well as protects women from being exploited. 259
1. Morality as a Legitimate Basis for Legislation
In addition, our legal system has considered morality a potentially
legitimate reason for legislation in a number of areas of society where
it is challenging to determine whether the moral imperative is
personal or public. 260 In each of these instances, where courts
reviewed regulation based at least in part on morality, the legislation
was allowed when it was based on a combination of both public
morality and private morality. 261 Susan Goldberg has classified
instances where the court has considered issues with overtones,
whether implicit or explicit, of morality-based legislation, into four
categories: "pure, composite, embedded, and inert."262 Pure morality
rationales involve no other possible reason for the legislation, which
256.

257.

258.

259.

260.
261.
262.

Cf Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State Police
Power, 12 Sr. THOMAS L. REv. 1, 34 (1999) (discussing restriction of harm to others
as basis for morality-based legislation in state police power context).
See generally Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 177
(1999) (acknowledging that in the past, commercial speech surrounding lotteries was
not protected by the First Amendment because the "demoralizing influence upon the
people" was a legitimate reason to restrict advertising about lotteries). This same case
identifies the governments concerns about gambling as "contribut[ing] to corruption
and organized crime; underwrit[ing] bribery, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal
conduct; impos[ing] a regressive tax on the poor; and 'offer[ing] a false but
sometimes irresistible hope of financial advancement."' /d. at 185 (quoting Brief of
Respondent at 15-16, Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass 'n, 527 U.S. 173, 1999 WL
161073, at *15-16).
See generally Lisa Lucas, Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling
the Twenty-First Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REv. 899, 915
(2005) (discussing movement to curb prevalence of alcohol).
See generally Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL.
L. REv. 523, 545 (2000) (discussing public health concerns for criminalization of
commercial sex).
See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003).
See Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1235-36.
!d. at 1244.
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is rare. 263 Pure morality rationales were successful (for a time) in
Bowers v. Hardwick/ 64 and were attempted but unsuccessful in
Lawrence v. Texas. 265 In these two cases, the only reasons provided
for legislatively restricting behavior that had no effect beyond the
individuals involved was concern about the virtuousness of that
behavior. 266 In other cases, morals rationales have been combined
with interests related to obvious means of reducing harm or
increasing benefits. 267 Goldberg names this combination of morality
with other reasons composite morals-based justifications.268 Other
cases imply a basis in morality, yet never actually discuss the moral

263. See id. at 1244-45.
264. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003)).
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right,
respondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law
and that there is none in this case other than the presumed belief
of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy
is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inadequate
rationale to support the law. The law, however, is constantly
based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even
respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority
sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be
declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that
the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this
basis.
!d.
265. Lawrence, 593 U.S. at 582-83.
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the
Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state
interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy,
but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral
disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a
sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a
law that discriminates among groups of persons.
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because
legal classifications must not be "drawn for the purpose of
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."
!d. (internal citations omitted).
266. Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1244.
267. !d. at 1245.
268. Id.
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implications. 269 These are referred to as using "embedded morals
rationale.'mo Finally, cases that use the inert morals rationale rely on
other reasons for the actual decision, but explicitly discuss the moral
implications. 271
2. Morality Alone Is Insufficient
Though many cases have mentioned morals as part of the rationale,
morality alone, or pure morality, has almost never been sufficient to
allow regulation. 272 Instead, the Supreme Court has increasingly
emphasized "observable societal harms. " 273 Vice alone, without
damage to others, has not been the subject oflegitimate regulation. 274
One of the reasons it is so difficult to· use morality to enforce
virtue-those personal decisions that do not result in societal harmis that virtue and the associated benefits that spring from a virtuous
life require the freedom to choose without coercion. 275 Even the
Catholic Church, one of the institutions from which moral
responsibilities spring, recognizes that religious freedom requires that
each person is treated with dignity, which is protected by the
constitution that governs society, regardless of their choices about
269. !d. at 1244 (identifying cases that restrict adult entertainment, obscenity, and foul
language).
270. !d. One example of"embedded morals rationale" that Goldberg cites is City ofErie v.
Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. 277 (2000). Pap's A.M relied on the city's interest in
combating the secondary effects of nude dancing to find the regulation content-neutral
and therefore subject to the standard applied to restrictions on symbolic speech rather
than the higher standard applied to content-based restrictions. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. at
295-96. The closest the Court came to mentioning morals as a rationale for the
regulation appeared when Justice O'Connor stated that '"few of us would march our
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see' specified
anatomical areas exhibited at establishments like [the nude dance club]." 529 U.S. at
294 (quoting Justice Steven's opinion in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
271. Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1246 (citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978), as an example). In this case the Court mentioned that land-use
regulations are generally upheld when '"the health, safety, morals, or general welfare'
would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land" yet the
decision rested on other reasons. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125 (quoting
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
272. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... ")).
273. Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1259.
274. See id. at 1260 (citing Professor Christopher Tiedeman's objection to the use of police
power solely to "banish vice and sin from the world").
275. See Cole, supra note 238, at 84; Kalscheur, supra note 237, at 9.
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morality. 276 And the associated decision-making that is afforded to
those who are entitled to exercise their own judgment requires that
"no one is forced to act in a manner contrary to their own beliefs, ...
no one is to be restrained from acting in accordance with their own
beliefs" and that "the dignity of the human person in no way depends
on whether or not the person's beliefs or actions are in accord with
religious or moral truth." 277
Legislation that encourages virtuous behavior that will have a
positive effect on others; that is, legislation that codifies a commonly
accepted duty to others may also be considered regulation of public
morality. For instance, statutes that establish compulsory education
impose a duty on parents to insure that their children receive at least a
minimal level of education. 278 Most would consider this a moral
obligation as part of parenthood, yet all fifty states and the District of
Columbia address compulsory education through legislation, and
many include criminal penalties for failure to comply. 279 The duty to
276. See Kalscheur, supra note 237, at 8-9.
277. /d. at 9.
278. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 380.1561 (West Supp. 2012).
Except as otherwise provided in this section, for a child who
turned age 11 before December 1, 2009 or who entered grade 6
before 2009, the child's parent, guardian, or other person in this
state having control and charge of the child shall send that child to
a public school during the entire school year from the age of 6 to
the child's sixteenth birthday. Except as otherwise provided in
this section, for a child who turns age 11 on or after December 1,
2009 or a child who was age 11 before that date and enters grade
6 in 2009 or later, the child's parent, guardian, or other person in
this state having control and charge of the child shall send the
child to a public school during the entire school year from the age
of 6 to the child's eighteenth birthday.
/d.

279. See 50 State Statutory Surveys, Compulsory Education, 0040 SURVEYS 6 (Westlaw
2007). A Colorado statue also imposes a legal obligation on parents in the following
provision:
The general assembly hereby declares that two of the most
important factors in ensuring a child's educational development
are parental involvement and parental responsibility. The general
assembly further declares that it is the obligation of every parent
to ensure that every child under such parent's care and supervision
receives adequate education and training. Therefore, every parent
of a child who has attained the age of six years on or before
August 1 of each year and is under the age of seventeen years
shall ensure that such child attends the public school in which
such child is enrolled in compliance with this section.
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 22-33-104(5)(a) (West 2011).
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provide children with an education has long been a part of American
jurisprudence. 280 In 1923, in Meyers v. Nebraska, the United States
Supreme Court pointed out that
[t]he American people have always regarded education and
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance
which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of
1787 declares: 'Religion, morality and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged.' Corresponding to the right of control, it is the
natural duty of the parent to give his children education
suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the states,
including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory
laws. 281
Other parental obligations are as commonly accepted and
considered some sort of natural duty as well. Child support
legislation codifies the duty of parents to provide financial support
for their children, an obligation that is so widely held that federal
statutes exist to enforce this obligation. 282 Yet these statutorily
enforced duties may also be classified as morally imposed obligations
on individual behavior. 283
C.

Current Demographics

Morality is generally considered to be based on commonly
accepted ideals of appropriate human conduct. Yet the ideas
regarding the appropriateness of allowing same-sex couples or single
individuals to have children may have evolved to the point where
there is no "commonly accepted ideal" regarding this behavior. In
fact, according to the United States Department of Health and Human
Services, the number of single women having children "increased ...
to historic levels in 2007. " 284 During that year, "about six in seven
births to teenagers were non-marital. Sixty percent of births to
280.
281.
282.

283.
284.

See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
/d. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Child Support and Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2006)
(establishing enforcement mechanism for collecting outstanding child support across
state boundaries).
See State Dep't of Revenue v. Hubbard, 720 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Mont. 1986) ("Child
support is a social and moral obligation imposed by law without court action.").
Joyce A. Martinet al., Births: Final Data for 2007, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. 24, Aug.
9, 2010, at 1, 2.
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women aged 20-24 years and almost one-third of births to women
aged 25-29 years were to unmarried women." 285 From 2002 to
2007, 286 increases in the number of non-marital births began to
increase steeply, reaching an increase of 26 percent from 2002 to
2007. 287
D. No Public Morality Reason Remaining

In light of the changing demographics, it seems reasonable to
suggest that social values relating to children and the need for a
heterosexual, two-parent household are changing. 288 If the reasons
for legislatively restricting unmarried and same-sex couples from
using the same form of surrogacy agreements that are available to
heterosexual married couples no longer involve public morality-the
protection of the best interests of the children-then the only reason
left to create this difference is private morality-imposing one
individual's ideas about virtuous behavior on another, in areas that
only affect the individuals involved. 289 As demonstrated in Part
V.B.2, using this type of morality-based justification is a not
legitimate reason to enact legislation that discriminates against those
who wish to build families using surrogacy but are not in a
heterosexual marriage. 290
VI. PURE MORALS-BASED LEGISLATION EQUALS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS

When the only reason for legislation that isolates a particular group
of people for different treatment is to impose a moral imperative, the
legislation is likely to be expressing a level of animus that is also
intolerable under the Equal Protection Clause. 291 Pure morals-based
legislation can demonstrate animosity toward a particular group and
285.
286.

!d. at 8.
2011 is the most current data available from the National Center for Health Statistics.

See id. at 1.
287. !d. at 14; STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, CHANGING PATTERNS OF NONMARITAL
CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES, NCHS DATA BRIEF 2 (May 2009).

See generally Douglas B. Downey & Brian Powell, Do Children in Single-Parent
Households Fare Better Living with Same-Sex Parents?, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 55
(1993); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of
Parents Matter?, 66 AM. Soc. REv. 159 (2001).
289. See supra Part V.A-B.
290. See supra Part V.B.2.
291. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down legislation that had "the
288.

peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group" as "an exceptional and ... invalid form of legislation").
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the moral choices that group generally makes. 292
The
unconstitutional animus toward homosexuals in Romer93 and Perr/ 94
reflected voters' disagreement with a particular lifestyle. Much of
this disagreement is based on the idea that homosexuality is
immoral. 295 Creating laws that work a "meaningful harm" based only
on a justification that expresses animosity toward the moral choices
of the individuals affected violates the Equal Protection Clause, and
therefore cannot be tolerated. 296
The current legislatively created options for surrogacy
arrangements in Florida, which allow both married and unmarried
people to engage the services of a surrogate carrier, but create more
risks, restrictions, and administrative burdens on those who are
unmarried than those who are married, create a meaningful harm that
can only be based on an illegitimate animosity toward the moral
choices of those who are singled out for more restrictive treatment. 297
Similar to the laws in Romer and Perry, which were unconstitutional,
the Florida statute that restricts gestational surrogacy contracts to
married couples only is also unconstitutional.
VII. CONCLUSION
For. many years courts assumed that legislatures had every right to
enact legislation to protect the public morals. 298 Early cases that
evaluated morality-based legislation focused on alcohol use,
prostitution, and obscenity. 299 The courts routinely found legislation
reasonable when it furthered some interest and protected the public's
view of a moral life. 300 However, as society changed, so did the

292.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See id. at 634 (explaining that the morals-based legislation before the court in that
case raises "the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected").
Romer, 517 U.S. 620; see discussion supra Part IV.C.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded by
Hollingsworth v. Perry. 133 S.Ct 2652 (2013).
See id. at 1095 (explaining the only possible reason for Proposition 8 was to express
disapproval for personal choices).
See id.
See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.B.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Countless
judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient proposition
that a governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and
unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation.").
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courts' comfort level with accepting the regulation of public morality
as a reason for restricting behavior. 301
Restricting access to surrogacy arrangements to only married,
heterosexual couples is only an effort to hang on to the moral values
of the past, despite the fact that the values of the present, and
potentially the future, are much more tolerant of a variety of types of
relationships and families.
Societal values have shifted from
oppressing those who choose different ways to build families, to
being tolerant, and accepting a variety of family situations and
valuing them all. It is time for the legislation to reflect this change
and provide the same options for the use of surrogacy agreements to
all individuals and couples, regardless of their marital status or sexual
orientation.

301. See id. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)) (majority
opinion).

654

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

